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Torts

by Deron R. Hicks*
I.
A.

PREMISES LIABILITY

Slip-and-Fall

The 1997 torts survey article addressed the confusing state of slip-andfall law as it developed since the 1980 decision by the Georgia Supreme
Court in Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon.' The article suggested that
although many members of the court of appeals were frustrated by the
formalistic approach to slip-and-fall jurisprudence that had developed
subsequent to the decision in Alterman Foods, the court of appeals
apparently felt constrained to adhere to that approach. The following
quote from the court of appeals decision in Coffey v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. 2 was cited as an example of that frustration:
Our Supreme Court has not yet rejected or revised the Alterman Foods
standards, and consequently they remain binding on this Court even
though we may now believe we have a better concept for allocating the
burdens on the parties. Nevertheless, because of recent divergences
within this Court in slip and fall cases, perhaps it is time for the
Supreme Court to revisit this issue.
The premises liability section of the tort survey article ended with
reference to the Georgia Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to review
the court of appeals decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co.4 Not long after
the publication of the 1997 tort survey article, the Georgia Supreme

* Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.F.A., 1990); Mercer University, Walter F. George School
of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
2. 224 Ga. App. 824, 482 S.E.2d 720 (1997).
3. Id. at 827, 482 S.E.2d at 724 (citations omitted).
4. 222 Ga. App. 711, 476 S.E.2d 29 (1996).
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Court issued its decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co.5 As anticipated in
last year's survey article, the decision in Robinson reflects an effort by
the supreme court "to address the inconsistencies that have developed
over the last seventeen years in the application
of the Alterman Foods
6
test and ...

to revisit the test altogether."

The facts in Robinson are fairly standard fare for a slip-and-fall case.
Plaintiff, Henrietta Robinson, injured her knee in one of defendant's
supermarkets when she slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the
floor of the store.' The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury "was her failure to exercise ordinary care for her personal
safety."8 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to defendant.9 The Georgia Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to examine 'the proper standard for determining
whether the plaintiff in a "slip and fall" premises liability case has
exercised ordinary care sufficient to prevail against a motion for
summary judgment.'"10 Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme
court held:
[An invitee's failure to exercise ordinary care for personal safety is not
established as a matter of law by the invitee's admission that she did
not look at the site on which she subsequently placed her foot. Rather,
the issue is whether, taking into account all the circumstances existing
at the time and place of the fall, the invitee exercised the prudence an
ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation."
As in any analysis of slip-and-fall law in Georgia, the supreme court
began its decision in Robinson with a brief review of the decision in
Alterman Foods.12 The court first noted that the decision in Alterman

Foods represented an effort by the supreme court in 1980 to address the
tendency of trial and appellate courts to find a jury issue in every slipand-fall case.13 To this end, the court in Alterman Foods established
a two part test:
[I]n order to state a cause of action in a case where the plaintiff alleges
that due to an act of negligence by the defendant he slipped and fell on

5. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
6. Deron Hicks, Torts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 285, 295 (1997).
7. 268 Ga. at 735, 493 S.E.2d at 405.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.
13.

Id. at 736, 493 S.E.2d at 405.
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 406.
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a foreign substance on the defendant's floor, the plaintiff must show (1)
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign
substance and (2) that the plaintiff was without knowledge of the
substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was
prevented from discovering the foreign substance."
In Robinson the supreme court noted that appellate courts tended to
skip over the first prong of the Alterman Foods test and to resolve most
cases on the question of whether "the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the hazard equal or superior to that of the defendant or, would have had
equal or superior knowledge had the plaintiff exercised ordinary care for
personal safety." 5 Cases that dealt with the second prong of the test
established in the Alterman Foods decision fell into two categories.
First, the court acknowledged a line of cases in which summary
judgment had been granted to the owner/occupier of the premises on the
basis that the invitee "had admitted knowledge of the hazardous
condition and, with full appreciation of the danger, had chosen a course
of conduct which resulted in injury as a result of the hazardous
condition."16
A second line of cases, however, dealt with the situation in which the
invitee "attempted to explain that he fell due to a hazard of which he
was not aware . .. ." In this second line of cases, it was generally the
position of the defendant that the plaintiff failed to avoid a hazard of
which the plaintiff should have known.' 8 The second line of cases
culminated in the court of appeals decision in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,'9 in which
it was determined that an invitee who did not see the hazard which
caused the fall had failed, as a matter of law, to exercise the requisite
ordinary care for personal safety when the invitee admitted he/she
would have seen the hazard had the invitee been looking at the floor
20

In the aftermath of the decision in Smith, the supreme court noted that
the "plaintiffs were repeatedly rebuffed based upon their admission that
hazard had they been looking at the site where
they would have seen the
21
they placed their foot."

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

246 Ga. at 623, 272 S.E.2d at 330.
268 Ga. at 736, 493 S.E.2d at 406.
Id.
Id. at 738, 493 S.E.2d at 407.
See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 808, 406 S.E.2d 234 (1991).
Id.
268 Ga. at 738, 493 S.E.2d at 407.
Id.
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The supreme court in Robinson, however, expressed concern that the
prior decisions of the court of appeals placed too great an emphasis on
the second prong of the Alterman Foods test. The court stated:
By foregoing a resolution of the owner/occupier's knowledge of the
hazard in favor of a holding based on the determination that an invitee
who did not see a hazard should have seen it in the exercise of
ordinary care for personal safety, the courts, in effect, ruled as a
matter of law that the invitee had knowledge of the hazard equal to or
greater than that of the owner/occupier without knowing the extent of
the latter's knowledge, and implicitly held that an invitee's duty to
exercise ordinary care in looking where one is going is paramount to
an owner/occupier's duty to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and
keeping the premises safe for invitees.22
In reaching its decision, the court first noted that issues of negligence,
proximate cause, and contributory negligence are generally not issues
that can be resolved upon motion for summary judgment.2 The court
then turned its focus to the duty owed by the owner/occupier to invitees.
As the court noted, the prior decisions of the court of appeals had
"relegated to the shadows the duty owed by an owner/occupier to an
invitee."24 According to the court,
[bly encouraging others to enter the premises to further the owner/occupier's purpose, the owner/occupier makes an implied representation that reasonable care has been exercised to make the place safe for
those who come for that purpose, and that representation is the basis
of the liability of an owner/occupier for an invitee's injuries sustained
in a "slip-and-fall."25
Although the court noted an invitee must exercise ordinary care to
discover and avoid injury, the court stated that an invitee "is not bound
to avoid hazards not usually present on the premises in which the
invitee, exercising ordinary care, did not observe."2 6 In particular, the
court noted that the "invitee is not required, in all circumstances, to look
continuously at the floor, without intermission, for defects in the
floor."27 In short, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable
lookout depends on
28
all the circumstances at the time and place."

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 739, 493 S.E.2d at
Id.
Id. at 740, 493 S.E.2d at
Id. at 741, 493 S.E.2d at
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 409.
Id.
Id. at 742, 493 S.E.2d at

408.
408.
409.
409.
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The court also noted that prior decisions of the court of appeals
radically transformed the "plain view" doctrine. 29 This doctrine, as it
was originally conceived, stated that a person is under a duty to look
where that person is walking and to see large objects "'in plain view
which are at a location where they are customarily placed and expected
,.." The court noted, however, that the "plain view" doctrine
to be .

had developed to the point that there were no "reasonable limits" on its
application.31
According to the court:
The "plain view" doctrine is the equivalent of the "constructive knowledge" aspect of voluntary negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Voluntary negligence is applicable when the invitee knew or should
have known of the hazard and proceeded, and the "plain view" doctrine
is applied to a hazard in plain view at a location where it is customarily found and can be expected to be, but which the invitee professes not
to have seen prior to the fall. Even though the invitee had no actual
knowledge of the hazard before being injured, the invitee should have
known of the hazard's presence.32
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the court rejected
prior appellate decisions "which hold as a matter of law that an invitee's
failure to see before falling the hazard which caused the invitee to fall
constitutes a failure to exercise ordinary care."3" The court stated,
[d]emanding as a matter of law that an invitee visually inspect each
footfall requires an invitee to look continuously at the floor for defects,
a task an invitee is not required to perform since the invitee is entitled
to assume that the owner/occupier has exercised reasonable care to
make the premises safe for the invitee and continues to exercise such
care while the invitee remains on the premises.34
The court's inquiry, however, did not end at that point. According to the
court, "our examination of slip-and-fall case law revealed other troubling
aspects of the judicial treatment of the invitee's exercise of ordinary care
for personal safety".35 Accordingly, the court concluded its decision by
addressing two additional issues: (1) the proper application of the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 743, 493 S.E.2d at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 743-44, 493 S.E.2d at 411.
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distraction doctrine, and (2) the burdens of proof applicable in a slip-andfall case. a"
The court first noted that "the distraction doctrine holds that 'one is
not bound to the same degree of care in discovering or apprehending
danger in moments of stress or excitement or when the attention has
been necessarily diverted .... .'"v The application of this doctrine
excuses an invitee from exercising the standard of care ordinarily due
under the circumstances because the invitee's attention has been
distracted."
In Robinson, however, the court expressed concern over
the variety of applications of the distraction doctrine as reflected in
recent decisions of the court of appeals.3 9 In delineating the appropriate contours of the doctrine, the court stated:
[W]hen an invitee explains that he was not looking at the location of
the hazard which caused injury because of something in the control of
the owner/occupier,which purported distraction is of such a nature the
defendant might have anticipated it would divert an invitee's attention,
e.g. the conduct of a store employee, the premises construction or
configuration, or merchandise displayed of such a nature that its
presence would not have been anticipated by the invitee, the invitee
"has presented some evidence of the exercise of reasonable care for [the
invitee's] own safety." It will then be for the fact-finder to determine
if the injuries sustained were proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence and whether the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care
for personal safety.4"
The court's decision represents an express rejection of the court of
appeals decision in Ferguson v. Scadron,4 1 in which the court of appeals
held "that the invitee's offer of a specific reason for not looking where he
was going, regardless of the involvement of a store employee, created a
jury question .... " 2 According to the court in Robinson, however, the

36. Id. at 744, 493 S.E.2d at 411.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 744-45, 493 S.E.2d at 411.
39. See, e.g., Barentin v. The Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224, 443 S.E.2d 485 (1994)
(employee-initiated conversations may offer reasonable basis for invitee's failure to look
where invitee is walking); Carr v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 Ga. App. 768, 487 S.E.2d 415
(1997) (any conversation between invitee and employee may be evidence of invitee's
exercise of care); Ferguson v. Stadron, 227 Ga. App. 694, 489 S.E.2d 873 (1997).
40. 268 Ga. at 746, 493 S.E.2d at 412 (emphasis added) (quoting Barentine v. Kroger
Co., 264 Ga. 224, 225, 443 S.E.2d 485 (1994)).
41. 227 Ga. App. 614, 489 S.E.2d 873 (1997).
42. 268 Ga. at 746, 493 S.E.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
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distraction doctrine is only applicable when the plaintiff has been
distracted by "something in the control of the owner/occupier ....
Finally, the court addressed the burdens of proof applicable in a slipand-fall case. The court first noted that the decisions inAlterman Foods,
Inc. v. Ligon" and Lau's Corp. v. Haskins45 "placed upon the plaintiff
the onus of proving both the defendant's knowledge and the plaintiff's
lack of negligence in order to stay in court."46 As the court noted, after
the decision in Lau's Corp., the defendant had "only to point to the
deficiency in the plaintiff's case and no longer had to affirmatively
negate by the presentation of evidence a central element of the plaintiff's
case ... .47 Because the decision in Lau's Corp. "modified the practical
application of the Alterman Foods standard, . . . [the court in Robinson
decided to] modify Alterman Foods somewhat in order to regain balance
in the allocation of the burden of proof."4' According to the court:
A slip-and-fall plaintiff need not necessarily produce evidence which
disproves the plaintiff's negligence to withstand a motion for summary
judgment-the burden of coming forward with such evidence arises only
after it has been established or assumed the defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of the hazard, and the defendant presents
evidence that the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused either by
the plaintiff's voluntary negligence, i.e., plaintiff's intentional and
unreasonable exposure of self to a hazard of which plaintiff has
knowledge, or by the plaintiff's casual negligence, i.e., the plaintiff's
failure to exercise ordinary care for personal safety. In this way, the
defendant has the evidentiary burden as to the issue of the plaintiff's
negligence after it has been established or assumed for purposes of a
motion for summary judgment that the defendant was negligent ....
Only after the defendant has produced evidence of the plaintiff's
negligence does the plaintiff have the burden of producing rebuttal
evidence that the invitee's failure to ascertain the existence of the
hazard was due to actions or conditions within the control of the
defendant, which actions or conditions are of such a nature that the
defendant knew or should have known they would have diverted the
invitee's attention from looking where he was going.49
The underlying rationale for the supreme court's decision in Robinson
appears to be the court's suggestion that summary judgment in slip-and-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
268 Ga. at 746, 493 S.E.2d at 413.
Id.
Id. at 747, 493 S.E.2d at 413.
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 413-14.
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fall cases should be granted only in those rare situations when the
evidence is "plain, palpable, and undisputed." ° This conclusion,
however, is in direct conflict with the motivation underlying the decision
reached by the same court in 1982 in Alterman Foods. In that decision,
the court expressed its concern that the standard applicable in slip-andfall cases resulted in very few cases being disposed of on motion for
summary judgment.5' The Robinson decision, however, is clearly not
an attempt by the court to find an acceptable middle ground. Rather,
the decision reflects an explicit effort by the court to "swing the
pendulum" back to a pre-Alterman Foods climate in which few, if any,
slip-and-fall decisions were disposed of on motion for summary
judgment.5 2 However, by failing to seek an acceptable middle ground
(if such even exists), it is almost certain the supreme court will one day
again be forced to address this very same issue in an effort, as the court
did in Alterman Foods, to provide some basis for summary judgment in
slip-and-fall decisions.
Although the supreme court in Robinson repeatedly stated the
owner/occupier is not "an insurer of the invitee's safety," the decision in
Robinson may ultimately have that very effect. Robinson sends a clear
signal to the lower courts that the resolution of slip-and-fall cases on
motion for summary judgment is highly disfavored.53 The practical
effect of such a decision is that owners/occupiers and their insurers,
faced with the prospect of costly and disruptive litigation, may very well
choose to settle marginal cases that may have once been the subject of
a motion for summary judgment. In this respect, it is clear the court
believed that the owner/occupier of the premises is in a much better
position both to prevent injury to invitees and to spread the risk of loss
should such an injury occur. Although the court notes the owner/occupier is in a better position to prevent dangerous conditions on its
premises, 4 the court is noticeably silent on the practical and economic
effects of its decision. Tort law is, if nothing else, a reflection of public
policy. This is particularly true in the area of premises liability law. In
this respect, the court's, decision in Robinson reflects a policy decision
that the cost of making the premises safe is worth the increased costs
consumers will ultimately pay for such measures as increased staff and
insurance, which costs will ultimately be spread among the consumer
base as a cost of doing business.

50. Id. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
51. Id. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
52. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 740, 493 S.E.2d at 408.
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In preparing a tort survey article, the author is always asked to
identify any "trends" evident in the decisions included within the survey
period. The decision in Robinson is not evidence of a "trend." Rather,
it is a distinct and clear statement that slip-and-fall law as we knew it
is no more. In one swift blow, the supreme court completely altered the
state of slip-and-fall jurisprudence in Georgia. Although it remains to
be seen exactly how the trial courts and the court of appeals will
interpret and apply the Robinson decision, it is clear the pendulum has
swung swiftly and quickly back in favor of the plaintiff.
B.

Criminal Attacks

In March 1997, the Georgia Supreme Court issued its decision in
Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker.55 In that decision, the supreme
court rejected the proposition that a landlord's knowledge of prior
criminal acts against property cannot as a matter of law establish the
foreseeability of a crime against a person.5 6 According to the court in
Sturbridge, "[sluch a restrictive and inflexible approach does not square
with common sense or tort law ....
The decision in Sturbridge
represented a departure from the line of authority that developed in the
aftermath of Lau's Corp. v. Haskins,58 in which the supreme court held
a landlord's knowledge of prior criminal acts against property did not as
a matter of law make it foreseeable that a criminal act against a person
could or would occur.59
In Walker v. St. Paul Apartments, Inc.,6 the Georgia Court of
Appeals followed the new standard set forth by the supreme court in
Sturbridge and reversed a grant of summary judgment to defendant
apartment building and its management following a robbery, assault,
and threatened rape of a tenant.6 Plaintiff in Walker brought suit
against her apartment building and its management after a robbery,
assault, and threatened rape which occurred on October 2, 1992. The
evidence revealed that the defendant apartment building employed fulltime security guards. The security guards, however, were not provided
a key to the front door of the apartment building, and thus, could not
lock the door at night.62 According to the court of appeals, "the
",5

55. 267 Ga. 785, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997).

56. Id. at 787, 482 S.E.2d at 341.
57. Id. at 786, 482 S.E.2d at 340.
58.

261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

59. Id. at 493, 405 S.E.2d at 477.
60.

227 Ga. App. 298, 489 S.E.2d 317 (1997).

61. Id. at 298, 489 S.E.2d at 317.
62. Id. at 299, 489 S.E.2d at 318.
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assailant apparently entered [the apartment building] when the security
guard left his post to check on a noise outside the building."13 The
evidence also revealed a significant number of prior purse snatchings as
The trial
well as some evidence of prior assaults on the property.'
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiff
appealed. 5
Relying upon the decision in Sturbridge, the court of appeals reversed
the trial court66 and held "it is improper to distinguish between
criminal attacks involving brutal physical assault and those which did
not, for this incorrectly suggests the landlord could lawfully safeguard
its tenants only from persons who commit criminal acts without
accompanying physical harm." 7 The court noted:
[In determining whether previous criminal acts are substantially
similar to the occurrence causing harm (which establishes the foreseeability of risk), the court must inquire into the location, nature and
extent of the prior criminal activities and their likeness, proximity or
relation to the crime in question; but, while the prior criminal activity
must be substantially similar to the crime in question, this does not
mean it must be "identical," for what is required is only that the prior
incidentbe sufficient to attractthe landlord'sattentionto the dangerous
condition which resulted in the litigated incident.68
Based on these factors, the court of appeals determined a jury could
reasonably find "that the particular danger which resulted in the assault
on plaintiff in this case was foreseeable under all the circumstances, and
that appellees were negligent in failing to exercise ordinary care to
guard against it.""
In Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, L.P.,7 °
however, the Supreme Court of Georgia, although acknowledging its
prior decision in Sturbridge, appears to have reverted to its preSturbridge approach to such cases in practice if not in theory. In
Prudential-Bacheplaintiff was raped and robbed after parking her car
in a parking garage underneath an apartment building owned by
defendant.7 1 The evidence in the case revealed "a number of crimes
against property, such as theft and vandalism, [had been] committed in

63.

Id.

64. Id.
65.
66.

Id. at 298, 489 S.E.2d at 318.
Id. at 300, 489 S.E.2d at 318.

67. Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 301, 489 S.E.2d at 319.
268 Ga. 604, 492 S.E.2d 865 (1997).
Id. at 604, 492 S.E.2d at 866.
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the parking garage."72 The trial court granted summary judgment to
defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed.7" In affirming the trial
court's decision, the court of appeals "relied solely on the principle that
prior property crimes could not create a factual issue regarding whether
a property owner knew or should have known that a crime against a
person, sexual or otherwise, might be committed on its premises."74
The supreme court, however, noted the very basis for the court of
appeals affirmance of the trial court's decision was explicitly rejected by
75
the supreme court in Sturbridge.
Nonetheless, the court held that
under the circumstances of the case, the court of appeals reached the
right decision.76
The court first noted in "determining whether previous criminal acts
are substantially similar to the occurrence causing harm, thereby
establishing the foreseeability or risk, the court must inquire into the
location, nature and extent of the prior criminal activities and their
likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question."77
Based on these factors, the court held the prior property crimes
committed on the defendant's premises did not create an issue of fact
with respect to whether defendant should have reasonably anticipated
that a violent sexual assault might occur on the premises.78
In
affirming the court of appeals, the court stated:
First, "the very nature" of the theft and acts of vandalism committed
in this case do not "suggest that personal injury may occur." Further,
because the parking garage where the prior crimes occurred is a
common area, used by all the tenants and their guests, there is only
the potential for a tenant to confront a thief in an isolated situation,
and, even if such an encounter occurs, there is always the possibility
that the isolation could be brief ....
Finally, a tenant generally will
have opportunities for escaping an isolated encounter with a thief in a
common area, but will not have similar opportunities when encountering a burglar in her apartment.79
According to the court, the facts in the present case were distinguishable
from the facts giving rise to the cause of action in Sturbridge. The court
stated that the "very nature" of the burglaries committed in Sturbridge

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605, 492 S.E.2d at 866.
Id.
Id., 492 S.E.2d at 866-67.
Id. at 606, 492 S.E.2d at 867.
Id.
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"'suggest[ed] that personal injury may occur'" during the unauthorized
entry into the dwelling house of another.8"
Justice Hunstein wrote a dissent to the majority's opinion.8 1 In her
dissent, Justice Hunstein sharply criticized the majority's opinion as
"inconsistent both legally and factually" with the court's prior decision
in Sturbridge.s2 According to Justice Hunstein:
It little benefits the bench, bar and public for this court to state a rule
in one case then inexplicably retreat from that rule the very next time
the issue appears. Here, eight months after this court held in Sturbridge that a jury, not the appellate courts, should resolve the question
of reasonable foreseeability, a majority of this court substitutes itself
as the finder of fact to hold that appellees' knowledge of pervasive
property-related criminal activity "cannot establish the foreseeability"
of the assault on appellant. In Sturbridge we rejected this inflexible
approach over Chief Justice Benham's lament that our holding
constituted "an unfortunate jettisoning of precedent." It appears now
that this court's effort in Sturbridge to "square [premises liability
cases] with common sense or tort law" was itself nothing more than an
aberration and that it is Sturbridge that is now being jettisoned by the
majority.83
II.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 5-1-11 provides, in part:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property
directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort,
irrespective of privity, to an actual person who may use, consume, or
reasonably be affected by the property who suffers injury to his person
or property because the property, when sold by the manufacturer, was
not merchantable and reasonably suited for the use intended, and its
condition when sold was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. 4
This code section, however, does not preclude suit against the distributor
of a defective product.8 8 For example, when a distributor has knowledge of a particular danger, the distributor has a duty to warn consumers of that danger. However, what if the manufacturer has already
provided a warning of that particular danger? In Farmer v. Brannan

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 607-08, 492 S.E.2d at 868.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (Supp. 1998).
Id.
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Auto Parts,Inc. ,86 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the duty of
a distributor to warn customers and users of a particular danger with a
product in situations in which the manufacturer of the product has
already warned consumers of that danger."
Plaintiff in Farmer purchased a can of Fix-a-Flat Tire Inflater after
one of the tires on his pickup truck went flat."8 The tire inflater
included a warning that informed plaintiff "the substance was flammable; that it should not be used near heat or flame; and that it would
remain flammable when transferred from the can into a tire."89 During
the course of the following three months, the air in plaintiff's tire
continued to leak. As it did, plaintiff filled his tire with air four or five
more times. Plaintiff, however, apparently believed that by refilling his
tire, he was replacing the inflater gas. Approximately three months
after first using the tire inflater, plaintiff discovered a crack in the rim
of his wheel and attempted to repair the crack by welding it. Plaintiff,
however, did not remove the flat tire from the rim before attempting to
weld the rim. When plaintiff's welding iron touched the rim of the tire,
the tire exploded and injured plaintiff.9 ° Plaintiff brought suit against
the distributor of the tire inflater to recover for the injuries he suffered
as a result of the explosion. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 91 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.92
On appeal, plaintiff argued "he did not understand that the substance
would remain flammable three-and-a-half months after he placed it in
the tire and believed the Fix-a-Flat had dissipated by that time."93
According to plaintiff, the distributor had a duty to warn him of that
particular danger.94 Plaintiff pointed to evidence in the record that,
prior to the incident, the vice president of defendant was aware that tire
inflaters such as Fix-a-Flat formed an explosive gas when the propellant
in the tire inflater was mixed with air.95
The majority of the court of appeals agreed with plaintiff's position
that "the distributor 'of a product which, to [its] actual or constructive
knowledge, involves danger to users [has] a duty to give warnings of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

231 Ga. App. 353, 498 S.E.2d 583 (1998).
Id. at 353, 498 S.E.2d at 584.
Id.
Id. at 354, 498 S.E.2d at 584.
Id.
Id. at 353, 498 S.E.2d at 584.
Id. at 357, 498 S.E.2d at 586.
Id. at 354, 498 S.E.2d at 584.
Id. at 355, 498 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 354, 498 S.E.2d at 584-85.
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such danger ... at the time of sale and delivery.' 96 The court of
appeals noted, however, that the case at hand presented a unique
situation. This court of appeals recognized that, although the distributor
had kinowledge of a particular danger, "the manufacturer had already
provided written warning to the consumer of the danger."9" Even
assuming the warning provided by the manufacturer did not address the
specific danger at issue, the court held there was no evidence the
defendant "knew or should have known the length of time the substance
remained flammable or that the distributor knew or should have known
consumers would misunderstand the manufacturer's warning.... 9
Judge Blackburn wrote a dissent to the majority's opinion in which
Presiding Judge McMurray joined. 99 According to the dissent, because
the vice president of defendant had knowledge that tire inflaters could
be dangerous, defendant "had a duty to exercise reasonable care to
determine whether the tire inflaters [defendant] was selling were
As the dissent stated, defendant made a unilateral
dangerous."'0 °
decision that the warning labels on the tire inflaters were adequate to
warn consumers of the danger.'0 ' According to the dissent, "the
reasonableness of this determination should be left to a jury."10 2
III.

TRESPASS

3

In Bullock v. Jeon, ' the Georgia Court of Appeals held a jury issue
existed on the amount of time reasonably necessary to enable a
trespasser "to effect his departure" after the trespasser has been asked
to leave premises open to the general public.0 4 In Bullock plaintiff
and defendant owned competing liquor stores located in close proximity
to one another. In October 1994, plaintiff sent one of his employees over
to defendant's store to check out defendant's prices. Later that same
day, defendant went over to plaintiff's store to confront plaintiff about
the price-checking. After defendant started cursing at plaintiff, plaintiff
asked defendant to leave the premises. Defendant, however, initially
refused. After plaintiff threatened to call the police, defendant exited
the store. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit against defendant for

96. Id., 498 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting Beam v. Omark Indus., 143 Ga. App. 142, 237
S.E.2d 607 (1977)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 355, 498 S.E.2d at 585.
99. Id. at 357, 498 S.E.2d at 586.
100. Id. at 358, 498 S.E.2d at 587.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 226 Ga. App. 875, 487 S.E.2d 692 (1997).
104. Id. at 876, 487 S.E.2d at 695.
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trespass." 5 The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's trespass claim.1 6 On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed.10 7
On appeal, defendant asserted that plaintiff's "failure to leave the
premises immediately upon being asked to leave [gave] rise to a cause
of action for trespass.""0 8 The court of appeals first noted, "[e]vidence
that a defendant refused to leave a store after he is asked to leave is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A.
section 16-7-21(b)(3)."' 0 9 Quoting from the decision in Hollis v.
State," however, the court noted:
"[elven a trespasser, where he is rightfully ordered to leave a building
by one having the premises in charge, is entitled to be allowed such a
period of time as is necessary to enable him to make his exit from the
room or building he is ordered to vacate. The amount of time
reasonably necessary to enable such a trespasser to effect his departure
may be varied by circumstances, and is a question of fact for determination by the jury.""
The court of appeals held a jury issue existed on whether defendant
left the premises within a reasonable period of time.'12 The court
noted that evidence showing defendant was asked to leave the premises

several times and had refused to do so, and that the defendant left the
premises only after plaintiff threatened to call the police, was sufficient
for a jury to reasonably find that the defendant did not leave within a

reasonable period of time." 3 On this4 basis, the court of appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court."

IV. DEFAMATION
In addition to the issue of trespass, the court of appeals in the case of
Bullock v. Jeon"5 also addressed the issue of under what circumstances "disparaging words" may constitute slander per se pursuant to

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
308, 79
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 875, 487 S.E.2d at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876, 487 S.E.2d at 694.
13 Ga. App. 307, 79 S.E. 85 (1913).
226 Ga. App. at 876, 487 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting Hollis v. State, 13 Ga. App. 307,
S.E. 85 (1913)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
226 Ga. App. 875, 487 S.E.2d 692 (1997).
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O.C.G.A. section 51-5-4.116 As noted previously, defendant in Bullock
entered plaintiff's liquor store and confronted plaintiff about an incident
in which plaintiff sent one of plaintiff's employees into defendant's store
to check on defendant's liquor prices. As defendant was leaving
plaintiff's premises, defendant turned to plaintiff and called plaintiff a
"m_-f .""' This confrontation was apparently witnessed by many of
plaintiff's employees, customers, and distributors. Plaintiff subsequently
brought suit against defendant for slander.118 The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's slander claims,
and the court of appeals affirmed." 9
On appeal, plaintiff argued defendant had committed slander per se
by referring to plaintiff as a "m -f .120 It was plaintiff's position that
the term used by defendant suggested that plaintiff had committed a
crime punishable by law, specifically, having sexual intercourse with his
mother.' 2' According to plaintiff, defendant's actions amounted to
slander per se, "thus negating the O.C.G.A. section 51-5-4 requirement
of showing special damages."'22
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals first noted
that "[d]isparaging terms are slanderous per se only if the terms convey
'the impression that the crime in question is being charged, [and also
are] couched in such language as might reasonably be expected to convey
the meaning to anyone who happened to hear the utterance."" 23 The
court noted that if "a statement's meaning is not ambiguous and can
reasonably have but one interpretation, the question is one of law for the
court."' 24 The court of appeals held the words used by defendant did

116. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (Supp. 1998) provides:
(a) Slander or oral defamation consists in: (1) Imputing to another a crime
punishable by law; (2) Charging a person with having some contagious disorder
or with being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude from society; (3)
Making charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession,
calculated to injure him therein; or (4) Uttering any disparaging words productive
of special damage which flows naturally therefrom. (b) In the situation described
in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section, special damage is essential
to support an action; in the situations described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of
subsection (a) of this Code section, damage is inferred.
117. 226 Ga. App. at 877, 487 S.E.2d at 694.
118. Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 879, 487 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 877, 487 S.E.2d at 694.
Id.
Id. at 876, 487 S.E.2d at 695.

123. Id. at 877, 487 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting Anderson v. Fussell, 75 Ga. App. 866, 869,
44 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1947)).
124. Id., 487 S.E.2d at 695.
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not impute a violation of any criminal law by the plaintiff.'25 According to the court of appeals, the term "in-f"generally communicates "an
126
obscenity reflecting the speaker's agitated and angry state of mind.
The court noted that although the term certainly constitutes a "degrading insult. .

.,

it has not been interpreted as an actual accusation that

the object of the remark has committed an illegal sexual act."'2 7 In
short, the court concluded that "[no reasonable person exposed to
[defendant's] invective, uttered as a parting shot after he. had been
ordered off the premises and immediately following an argument
unrelated to sex, could have concluded that [defendant] was accusing
[plaintiff] of having sexual intercourse with his own mother."'2 8
Accordingly, the court held, in the absence of any showing of special
damages, plaintiff could not sustain his cause of action for slander.'29
In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff in a defamation action
3
must offer some evidence that the statements at issue were false.' 0
In Blomberg v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.,' the senior vice president of a
career marketing company brought suit against a former client of the
company after the former client was quoted in a newspaper article as
stating that the plaintiff vice president was a "silver-tongued devil."" 2
As in Bullock, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant on the basis that defendant's remark was not subject to a
defamatory interpretation. 33 The trial court, however, also granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff
failed to prove the statement was false.'3 4 In affirming the trial court's
decision, the court of appeals noted the defendant's remark "is an
assertion that cannot be proved false." 35 "As a statement of wholly
subjective opinion not capable of proof, it cannot support
an action for
16
defamation against [defendants] for publishing it."

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 877-78, 487 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 877, 487 S.E.2d at 695.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878, 487 S.E.2d at 695.
Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Thrasher, 264 Ga. 235, 236, 442 S.E.2d 740 (1994).
228 Ga. App. 178, 491 S.E.2d 430 (1997).
Id. at 179, 491 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 178, 491 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 179, 491 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 180, 491 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 181, 491 S.E.2d at 433.
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IMMUNITY

Bearden,"7

In Bearden v.
the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
the application of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. Paula
Bearden and David Bearden married in 1987 and separated in early
1989. Subsequent to their separation, however, the Beardens frequently
spent time together, including overnight trips. On July 11, 1995, the
Beardens were returning from an overnight swimming trip when they
were in an automobile accident. Mrs. Bearden subsequently brought
suit against Mr. Bearden for personal injuries that she allegedly received
as a result of his negligent operation of the motor vehicle." 8 Mr.
Bearden filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Mrs.
Bearden's claim was barred by the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. 3 9 The trial court granted Mr. Bearden's motion for summary
judgment. 4 ° On appeal, the court of appeals reversed.'
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Mr. Bearden on the basis that the traditional policy reasons
for application of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine were not
present in the case.' 4' Citing to the Georgia Supreme Court's 1984
decision in Harris v. Harris," the court of appeals stated the traditional policy reasons for interspousal tort immunity are "(1) the belief
that abrogation of interspousal tort immunity would foster marital
disharmony and disunity and (2) the justifiable fear of collusive or
friendly lawsuits between spouses."'" Relying upon evidence in the
record (1) that the Beardens were separated in early 1989, (2) that
during separation Mr. Bearden lived with other women, (3) that Mrs.
Bearden did not have any hope that the parties would reconcile, and (4)
that Mrs. Bearden filed for divorce on the same day she commenced the
present action, the court of appeals held the traditional policy reasons
did not apply.'4'

46
Chief Judge Andrews wrote a dissent to the majority opinion.
Relying upon the court of appeals decision in Standfield v. Stand-

137. 231 Ga. App. 182, 499 S.E.2d 359 (1998).
138. Id. at 182, 499 S.E.2d at 360.
139. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8 (Supp. 1998).
140. 231 Ga. App. at 182, 499 S.E.2d at 360.
141. Id. at 184, 499 S.E.2d at 361.
142. Id.
143. 252 Ga. 387, 313 S.E.2d 88 (1984).
144. 231 Ga. App. at 183, 499 S.E.2d at 361.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 184, 499 S.E.2d at 361.
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field,'4 7 Judge Andrews stated that the interspousal tort immunity
' 18
doctrine should be abrogated only in "'extreme ... situations."'
According to Judge Andrews, the evidence in the case clearly revealed
that "the parties maintained a substantial ongoing marital relationship
by seeing each other frequently and spending the night together."'4 9
Judge Andrews noted "'for purposes of applying the interspousal
immunity doctrine, there is a significant difference between... a bad
marriage and... a non-existent marriage."'' 50 Although the evidence
in the case may have indicated the Beardens had a bad marriage, Judge
Andrews asserted "this was not a case in which there was clearly no
marital harmony to preserve and no reasonable apprehension of
collusion between the spouses."' 5'

VI.
A.

DAMAGES

Punitive Damages

In Webster v. Boyett,'52 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed
"whether evidence of a defendant's similar acts or omissions is relevant
in determining liability for punitive damages and, if so, the proper
procedure to be followed in handling the admission of the evidence." 3
In Boyett plaintiff brought suit against defendant after she was injured
in an automobile accident in which defendant pled guilty to driving
under the influence. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings based on
O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1. The court also granted defendant's motion
in limine and excluded evidence of a prior DUI in the first phase of the
bifurcated proceeding.'
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for
$7,500 in compensatory damages. However, the jury declined to award

147. 187 Ga. App. 722, 371 S.E.2d 265 (1988).
148. 231 Ga. App. at 184, 499 S.E.2d at 362.
149. Id. at 185, 499 S.E.2d at 362.
150. Id. (quoting Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722, 723-24, 371 S.E.2d 265, 267
(1988)).
151. Interestingly, the majority opinion relied upon the fact that Mrs. Bearden filed her
divorce action on the same day she commenced the underlying civil action as a basis for
finding no evidence of collusion and as a basis for finding there was no marital harmony
to be preserved. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent, however, addressed the fact
that this very same evidence could be viewed as evidence of collusion. That is, despite the
fact that the parties "separated" in early 1989, Ms. Bearden did not deem it necessary to
file for divorce until after she was injured in a motor vehicle accident and even then did
not actually file the divorce action until the same day she filed the civil action.
152. 269 Ga. 191, 496 S.E.2d 459 (1998).
153. Id. at 191, 496 S.E.2d at 460.
154. Id.
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punitive damages, and plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals reversed
and held that the trial court had abused its discretion by excluding
evidence of defendant's prior DUI during the first phase of the bifurcated
proceeding and by refusing to
trifurcate the proceeding.15 On appeal,
15 6
the supreme court reversed.
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the supreme court
first noted that in the 1985 Moore v. Thompson decision, 5 7 it held
"evidence of the defendant's prior and subsequent guilty pleas to driving
under the influence was admissible on the question of punitive
damages." 5 ' As the court explained, the basis for the decision in
Moore was "that the extent of the defendant's willful misconduct,
wantonness and entire want of care in driving under the influence could
not be gauged solely from the incident in issue, but that evidence of
other DUI incidents was relevant to the question of punitive damages."159 The court in Moore, however, recognized that insofar as evidence of prior and subsequent DUIs would have a prejudicial effect on
defendant's liability for compensatory damages, trial courts should "'try
the issue of punitive damages separately in a bifurcated procedure or in
a separate trial.'"'6 °
Two years after the decision in Moore v. Thompson, however, the
Georgia General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1. Section
51-12-5.1(d) provides, in part:
(1) An award of punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in a
complaint. In any case in which punitive damages are claimed, the
trier of facts shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial
whether an award of punitive damages shall be made. This finding
shall be made specially through an appropriate form of verdict, along
with the other required findings.
(2) If it is found that punitive damages are to be awarded, the trial
shall immediately be recommenced in order to receive such evidence as
is relevant to a decision regarding what amount of damages will be
sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the
circumstances of the case ...

155. Id.
156. Id. at 197, 496 S.E.2d at 464.
157. 255 Ga. 236, 336 S.E.2d 749 (1985).
158. Id. at 236, 336 S.E.2d at 749; 269 Ga. at 192, 496 S.E.2d at 460-61.
159. 269 Ga. at 192, 496 S.E.2d at 461.
160. Id.

161.

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1998).
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The bifurcated procedure required by section 51-12-5.1 effectively put
an end to the bifurcated procedure recommended by the supreme court
in Moore. As the court noted in Boyett,
courts must conduct either bifurcated or trifurcated trials under the
statute. Under the bifurcated trial, the jury would decide liability, the
amount of compensatory damages, and liability for punitive damages
in the first phase and the amount of punitive damages in the second
phase. Under the trifurcated trial, the jury would determine liability
and the amount of compensatory damages in the first phase, liability
for punitive damages in the second phase, and the amount of punitive
damages in the third phase." 2
The court noted that in the bifurcated procedure mandated by the
statute a problem arises when a plaintiff attempts to introduce evidence
of the defendant's prior DUIs on the issue of liability for punitive
damages." Although this evidence is clearly relevant to the issue of
punitive damages based on the decision in Moore, the evidence is also
likely to prejudice the finder-of-fact with respect to the issue of liability
for compensatory damages."
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the supreme court
declined to adopt any "bright-line rule."" 5 According to the court, "the
best way to guarantee a fair trial and ensure judicial economy is to
continue to give the trial judge discretion on when to admit the evidence
of prior and subsequent acts."'
The court first noted the general rule
that "trial judges may exercise discretion in excluding relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will confuse the issue, mislead the jury, or create substantial
danger of undue prejudice."" 7 In reaching its decision, the court
suggested trial courts should consider the prejudice to the parties, the
complexity of the issues, the potential for jury confusion, and the relative
convenience, economy, or delay that may result from the introduction of
such evidence."
Based on these factors, the supreme court held the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of
defendant's prior DUI in the liability phase of the bifurcated proceed69
ing.1

162.
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269 Ga. at 193, 496 S.E.2d at 461.
Id.
Id. at 195, 496 S.E.2d 463.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197, 496 S.E.2d at 464.
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In reversing the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals had
also held the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to trifurcate
the proceeding.170 In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the
court first noted that recent court of appeals decisions have suggested
that the trifurcated proceeding should be the preferred procedure for
dealing with the issue of punitive damages.'
Although the supreme
court noted that trifurcation is an option for trial courts to consider, the
court disagreed that the trifurcated procedure should be used "'in most
cases."" 72 The court stated:
It is the rare case where, due to the complexity of the issues or
evidence, the trial court should divide the trial into three separate
phases. First, although not completely devoid of purpose, a third phase
expends limited judicial resources by requiring the judge and jury to
hear evidence and render a verdict in three separate proceedings.
Second, the liability issues, witnesses, and evidence on both compensatory and punitive damages often may not differ substantially, thus
eliminating the desire for two separate phases on liability. Third, in
routine cases where there is less likelihood of confusion, a limiting
instruction may adequately protect the defendant from the prejudicial
effect of the similar act evidence. Finally, the trial courts in most tort
actions have been able to ensure a fair trial by applying the balancing
test,173despite their contrary rulings on when the evidence is admissible.
Accordingly, based on these factors, the supreme court held the trial
court 4 did not abuse its discretion in refusing to trifurcate the proceed17
ing.
The decision in Boyett, however, is particularly unsatisfying. It is still
unclear when and under what circumstances evidence of prior and
subsequent DUIs may be admissible in the liability phase of a bifurcated
proceeding. As the court noted in reaching its decision,
[tihere is, for example, a difference between a defendant who has been
convicted of one prior DUI in which no person was injured, as occurred
in this case, and a defendant who has been convicted of two prior DUIs
and two subsequent
DUIs that involve injuries, as occurred in Moore
17
v. Thompson.'

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 192, 496 S.E.2d at 460.
at 196, 496 S.E.2d at 463.
at 196-97, 496 S.E.2d at 463-64.
at 197, 496 S.E.2d at 464.
at 196, 496 S.E.2d at 463.
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The problem, however, is the evidence in Moore would appear to have
even more of a prejudicial effect on the issue of liability for compensatory
damages than the evidence presented in Boyett. That is, it appears the
more prejudicial the evidence is on the issue of liability, the more
relevant it may be to the issue of punitive damages.
Moreover, it appears that the balancing test adopted by the court in
Boyett may not be limited to the introduction of evidence of prior and
subsequent DUIs. In reaching its decision in Boyett, the court repeatedly spoke in broad terms of "prior similar acts." As such, it remains to be
seen what other "prior similar acts" may be deemed admissible in the
first phase of a bifurcated proceeding under section 51-12-5.1.
VII. SPOLIATION OR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF EVIDENCE
In Sharpnack v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc.,17 the Georgia Court of
Appeals suggested that the tort of spoliation of evidence should perhaps
be recognized in Georgia as a new cause of action.'7 7 The decision in
Sharpnack related to an appeal in a products liability action "based on
a tragic incident in which a 15-year-old boy received spinal injuries
which rendered him a quadriplegic when he dived from a mini-trampoline into an above-ground swimming pool." 7 8 In a prior appeal, the
court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant-manufacturer of the pool with respect to plaintiff's claims of
negligence and strict liability.'79 The prior appeal, however, did not
resolve several additional claims also raised in plaintiff's complaint.'
Accordingly, upon remand of the case to the trial court, defendantmanufacturer moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining
claims, to include plaintiff's claim that defendant should be liable in
damages for spoliation of evidence.'
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.8 2
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the basis
that even if the tort of spoliation of evidence existed under Georgia law,
the facts of the case before the court did not support such a claim.8 3
According to the court, plaintiff could not "establish any causal link
between the failure of his underlying claim and the alleged misconduct
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180.
181.
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231 Ga. App. 829, 499 S.E.2d 363 (1998).
Id. at 830, 499 S.E.2d at 364.
Id. at 829, 499 S.E.2d at 364.
Id. at 830, 499 S.E.2d at 364.
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In reaching its decision, however, the court

noted "spoliation of evidence has long been recognized in Georgia as an
appropriate basis for appropriate sanctions in the decision of the
underlying case."1" 5 Moreover, the court cited to decisions from
California, Florida, and Alaska in which courts recognized spoliation of
evidence as an independent tort.18 The court, however, recognized
that the tort of spoliation of evidence had not been expressly approved
of in any prior decision in Georgia.18 7 Nonetheless, according to the
court, "[r]ecognizing that the spoliation or concealment of evidence is a
serious discovery abuse, ...
remedies for that abuse may not be
adequate in the absence of recognizing a separate tort .... 188 The

court therefore suggested "a fresh look at the issue of whether Georgia
should recognize an independent tort of this type may be appropriate."'89 The court, however, as noted above, held the present case did
not present "an appropriate case in which to conduct such a re-examination of Georgia law."' 9°

184. Id.
185. Id. at 830, 499 S.E.2d at 364.
186. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Bondu v.
Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage,
718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
187. 231 Ga. App. at 831, 499 S.E.2d at 364.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.

